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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Scot Winfield Casey timely appeals from the district court's order revoking
probation and its order denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion requesting leniency.
On appeal, Mr. Casey argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process
and equal protection when it refused to augment the record on appeal with various
transcripts Mr. Casey requested to be created at the public's expense. Mr. Casey also
argues that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked probation and denied
his Rule 35 motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Casey was charged, by Information, with a felony charge of operating a
motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, and/or an intoxicating substance
(hereinafter "DUI"), obtaining a prescription drug by fraud, and a persistent violator

enhancement. (R, pp.51-53.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Casey entered an
Alford 1 plea to the DUI and pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor charge of possession of

a legend drug without a prescription. 2 (R., pp.69-72.) Upon Mr. Casey's guilty plea to
the felony DUI charge, the district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with
four years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. 3 (R., pp.83-85.) The district court then placed

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
At the change of plea hearing, the district court noted that the Information identified
Count II as obtaining a prescription drug by fraud and a persistent violator
enhancement, but the factual statement in support alleged that Mr. Casey was guilty of
rossession of a legend drug without a prescription. (R, p.72.)
Mr. Casey was sentenced to 120 days in county jail for his misdemeanor conviction.
(R., p.79.)
1

2

1

Mr. Casey on probation after he successfully completed his period of retained
Jurisdiction (hereinafter "rider'}
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation alleging
that Mr. Casey violated various terms of his probation.

(R, pp.98-100.)

At an

evidentiary hearing, Mr. Casey admitted to violating his probation by consuming alcohol
on a couple of occasions and by spending the night at an unapproved residence.
(12/13/11 Tr., p.6, L 19 - p.9, L.6.) The district court then found that Mr. Casey also
violated his probation by altering a urine sample and consuming a prescription
medication without authorization. (12/13/11 Tr., p.28, L 18 - p.30, L.3.) Thereafter, the
district court revoked Mr. Casey's probation and executed the sentence, but it reduced
the fixed portion of that sentence from four years to eighteen months. (R., pp.114-115;
12/13/11 Tr., p.37, L.19 - p.38, L.8.) Mr. Casey timely appealed. (R., pp.119-121.)
Mr. Casey then filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, which was denied by
the district court. (R., pp.117-118.)4
On appeal, Mr. Casey filed a motion to augment the record with various
transcripts and to suspend the briefing schedule pending the preparation of those
transcripts. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement
in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-3.) The State objected to
Mr. Casey's request for the transcripts.

(Objection to "Motion to Augment and to

Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof' (hereinafter,
Objection to Motion to Augment}, pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered
an order denying Mr. Casey's request for transcripts of the change of plea hearing, held
on October 20, 2010, the sentencing hearing, held on November 22, 2010, and the rider

2

review hearing, held on May 17, 2011.

(Order Denying Motion to Augment and to

Suspend the Briefing Schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment), pp. 1-

2.)

A motion to augment the record with the order denying Mr. Casey's Rule 35 motion
was previously filed and granted.
4

3

ISSUES

1,

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr, Casey due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked ML Casey's probation?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Casey's Rule 35
motion requesting leniency?

4

ARGUMENT

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Casey Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary Transcripts

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeaL In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues raised on appeaL
In this case, Mr. Casey filed a Motion to Augment, requesting various transcripts,
but that motion was denied by the Supreme Court On appeal, Mr. Casey is challenging
the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the transcripts outlined in the
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings, supra.

Mr. Casey asserts that the

requested transcripts are relevant to the issues of whether the district court abused its
discretion in revoking probation and denying his Rule 35 motion, because those items
fall within the applicable standard of review. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred
in denying his request

5

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Casey Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment .The ApQellate Record With The
Necessary Transcripts

1

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Casey With
Access. To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His
Sentencing Claims

The Constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAH0. CONST.
art. I§ 13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be 'fundamentally fair:
Lassiterv. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. ·18, 24
(1981).

State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution."

Maresh v. State,

Dept. of Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a relevant

I.C. § 19-2801

transcript, the transcript must be created at county expense.
LC. § 19-863(a}.

Idaho court rules also address this issue.

LC. § 1-1105(2);

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2

mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant
I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding

before the court .

. ." Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to
6

"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R 54.?(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for
review.
request.

The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they
In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal

protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record,

including a stenographic transcript of the

proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost" Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the
State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase
7

transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as
follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.

Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists, Id. at 20.
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In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

In

that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court Bums, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts.

The

Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be

9

adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections

to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requested transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on appeaL In
doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument that he/she
needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State wants to
deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the requested items
are not necessary for the appeaL Id
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct App.

2007).
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or face procedural default.

"It is well established that an appellant

bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court."
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416,

422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541
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(Ct App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review.

State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Casey fails to

provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply
and Mr. Casey's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action
alone which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer
apply.
Whether the transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district
court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether
the transcript is relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge
gained from its own official position and observations.

Downing v. State, 136 Idaho

367, 373-74 (Ct App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983)
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon
what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977)
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the
quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984)
(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected
11

to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case'} Thus, whether
the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court could rely
upon the information it already knew from presiding over the prior hearings when it
made the decision to revoke probation.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,
Docket No. 39057, 2012 Opinion No. 38 (Ct. App. 2012) (not yet final), which addressed
the foregoing argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on
probation. Id. at 1. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the
terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction.
Id. at 1-2.

After completing the rider, the district court placed the defendant on

probation. Id. at 2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and
the district court revoked probation.

The defendant appealed from the district

Id.

court's second order revoking probation Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the

question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings!' Id. at 4.
While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, at this point
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this case is not final. Moreover, it is distinguishable because Mr. Casey is challenging
not only the order revoking probation, but also the length of his sentence, which entails
an analysis of the district court's sentencing rationale.
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of
review. The requested transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review
all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court made
appropriate sentencing determinations.

See State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189

(Ct App. 1985) ("Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence
under Rule 35, [the Appellate Court's] scope of review includes all information submitted
at the original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce."); see also State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct App. 2009) ("When we
review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment
We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as
events occurring between the original sentencrng and the revocation of probation."
(emphasis added)). 5

In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in
Hanington. Specifically it held:
5

In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a//
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Morgan, at 4 (original emphasis). As stated above, Morgan is not a final opinion and
Mr. Casey is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal.

13

Further support for Mr. Casey's position can be found in State v. Warren, 123
Idaho 20 (Ct App, 1992). In that case, ML Warren was convicted of aggravated battery
in 1988 and placed on probation, Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked
and the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period
of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, which
was ultimately revoked. Id. The district court then reduced the length of Mr. Warren's
sentence sua sponte. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district court
should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that position,
Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial.

Id.

The Court of Appeals

addressed that argument, stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the
nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his
sentence reduction claim because he failed to provide a copy of the original
presentence investigation report (hereinafter, PSI) and a transcript of the original
sentencing hearing.

Id.

Even though the original sentence was not on appeal, and

happened years before the decision at issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the
transcript was necessary to address Mr. Warren's claims of error. Moreover, there was
no indication that a transcript of that hearing was created before the probation violation
hearing or that the district court referenced the original sentencing hearing at the
probation violation disposition hearing. It appears that the Court of Appeals assumed
that the original sentencing hearing would address the nature of the original offense.
Had Mr. Casey failed to request the transcripts at issue, the Warren opinion indicates
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that it would be presumed to support the district court's decision to execute the original
sentence.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both

due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial
proceedings on appeaL The decision to deny Mr. Casey's request for the transcripts
will render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing
transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions.

This functions as a

procedural bar to the review of Mr. Casey's appellate sentencing claims on the merits
and, therefore, Mr. Casey should either be provided with the requested transcripts or
the presumption should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Casey With Access
To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process Because
He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United States Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably related to due process that the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell:
the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure to
make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due
process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... [to] hold
otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted
to, "that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in
the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may
disregard."

Id. at 71-72.

15

In Douglas v. California, 372 U,S, 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
According to the United States Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U,S. at 397.
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Casey has not obtained
review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective
assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
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Furihermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held

that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal
Justice, The Defense Function.

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
decision to revoke probation. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Casey on the
probable role the transcripts may play in the appeaL
Mr. Casey is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Casey his

constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of
counsel in this appeaL Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.
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11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Casey's Probation
Mr. Casey asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its
discretion when it revoked his probation.

When a defendant appeals from an order

revoking probation the Idaho Court of Appeals has utilized the following framework:
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence
is within the discretion of the district court. LC. § 20-222. In a probation
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct App. 1987).

State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989).
Mr. Casey concedes that he violated the terms of his probation. Accordingly, he
only contests the district court's decision to revoke his probation.

"A district court's

decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the
court abused its discretion." State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009).
When a district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal,
the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether
the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and reached its
decision by an exercise of reason.

State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 (Ct App. 2003). "In deciding whether revocation
of probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether the
probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is
consistent with the protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct App.
2001).
While on probation, Mr. Casey was active in and provided service for a church.
(12/13/11 Tr., p.33, Ls.14-20.) Mr. Casey also completed an aftercare program during
the first sixteen weeks of his probation. (12/13/11 Tr., p.33, Ls.6-13.) According to trial
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counsel, the severity of ML Casey's probation violations does not warrant a prison
sentence. (12/13/11 Tr., p.3·1, L.19-p.32, L.4.)
In light of the foregoing information the district court abused its discretion when it
revoked probation.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Casey's Rule 35 Motion
Requesting Leniency
Mr. Casey argues that the unified sentence of eight years, with four years fixed,
is unduly harsh when it is viewed in light of the mitigating factors present in this matter.
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under LC.R. 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable:' Id.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits,
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997} (quoting

State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).

Mr. Casey does not allege that his

sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
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discretion, Mr. Casey must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. Id.
"Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under
Rule 35, [the appellate court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce." State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). "If the sentence was not
excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view
of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction."

State v.

Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006).

As a preliminary note, Mr. Casey incorporates the mitigating information
contained in Section II, supra, by this reference.
ML Casey provided new information in support of his Rule 35 motion. ML Casey
was involved in a work related injury which caused his "heel bone" to shatter and
herniated disks in his back.

(05/04/12 Tr., p.6, Ls.14-23,) Mr. Casey testified at his

Rule 35 hearing that he was only receiving a nerve blocker and anti-inflammatory
medications, but no pain medications. (05/04/12 Tr., p,6, L24- p.7, L2.) He went on to
testify that the lack of pain medications inhibits his mobility and he can only fight the
pain with a "mental block." (05/04/12 Tr., p.7, Ls.3-11,) Trial counsel also made the
following comment about Mr. Casey's medical conditions and how they are affected by
his incarceration:
The time he is doing in prison is a difficult time based upon his
orthopedic condition, his hepatitis, severe hepatitis, which will eventually
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require Interferon treatment or perhaps even more drastic medical care.
He also has a history of depression All of these make it basically a hard
time [sic] the he is doing within the prison system.
(05/04/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.10-16.)
Additionally, there were mitigating factors present in this matter which were
before the district court at sentencing which when viewed in conjunction with the
information Mr. Casey provided in support of his Rule 35 motion, supports the
conclusion that his sentence is excessive. Specifically, the nature of the offense is a
mitigating factor. Mr. Casey's counsel provided the following mitigating explanation for
the circumstances surrounding the instant offense:
In the present case .... he had a car parked in the parking lot of the
apartment building where his ex was living. He had been sleeping in the
car. And the allegation that led to the plea in this case was that he had
consumed prescription medications that impaired his ability to drive.
There was no extensive driving involved in this case.

[T]here was no indication that he intended to drive anywhere but from one
spot in the parking lot to another.
(05/04/12 Tr., p.9, L.20 - p.10, L.9.) Mr. Casey told the PSI investigator that he was
locked out and slept in his car. (PSI, p.12.) 6

He woke up four hours later and realized

he was parked in the fire lane and decided to move his car to another part of the parking
lot. (PSI, p.12.) He was backing into the new parking spot when he was observed by a
police officer. (PSI, p.12.)
Additionally, Mr. Casey's alcoholism is a mitigating factor.
diagnosed as being dependent on alcohol.

(PSI, p.3.)

upbringing, as both his parents were alcoholics.
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Mr. Casey was

Mr. Casey had a rough

(PSI, pp.21-22.)

Mr. Casey was

improving his ability to remain sober and prior to his incarceration he was able to
maintain sobriety for approximately a year and half (05/04/12 TL, p.6, Ls.5-13.)
ML Casey's employment background is a mitigating factoL Mr. Casey graduated
from high school and attended one year of college. (PSI, p.23.) For seventeen years,
Mr. Casey was a meat cutter by trade and owned "Frontier Meats" for approximately ten
years.

(PSI, p.25.)

He then worked for Freeze Furniture Factor as a carpenter for

seven years. (PSI, p.25.) Mr. Casey's employer accompanied him to the presentence
interview. (PSI, p.26.)
ML Casey's positive rider performance is a mitigating factor.
completed all of his programming while on his rider.

(PSI, p.42.)

Mr. Casey

Mr. Casey was

organized and prepared for his moral therapy classes. (PSI, p.44.) Mr. Casey ultimely
earned a probation recommendation form the Idaho Department of Correction. (PSI,
p.47.)
In sum, Mr. Casey provided new information in support of his rule 35 motion
indicating that the conditions of his confinement are exacerbating his medical problems.
When this is viewed in light of the other mitigating factors present in this matter it
supports the conclusion that his sentence is excessive.

The presentence report in this matter contains various attachments numbered
sequentially in the PDF format. For ease of citation this brief will adhere to that
pagination.
6
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CONCLUSION
ML Casey respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise
as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr, Casey respectfully

requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions for the district court to place
him on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Casey respectfully requests that this Court reduce
the fixed portion of his sentence. Alternatively, Mr. Casey respectfully requests that this
Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate
DATED this 8th day of November, 201

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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